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Abstract: This note descends from a talk I gave at the AI Lab's Revolving Seminar series
in November 1984K I offer it as an informal introduction to some work I've been doing
over the last year on common sense reasoning. Four themes wander in and out.
1) Computation provides an observation vocabulary for introspection. With a little
wolk, you can learn to exhume your models of everyday activities. Tnis method can
provide empirical grounding for computational theories of the central systems of mind.
2) The central systems of mind arise in each of us as a rational response to the
impediments to living posed by the laws of computation. One of these laws is that all
search problems (theorem proving for example) are intractable. Another is that no one
model of anything is good enough for all tasks. Reasoning from these laws can provide
theoretical grounding for computational theories of the central systems of mind.
3) Mental models tend to form mathematical lattices under the relation variously called
subsumption or generalization. Your mind puts a lot of effort into maintaining this lattice
because it has so many important properties. One of these is that the more abstract models
provide a normalized decomposition of world-situations that greatly constrains the search
for useful analogies.
4) I have been using these ideas in building a computational theory of routines, the
frequently repeated and phenomenologically automatic rituals of which most of daily life is
made. I describe this theory briefly.
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I took the title from Fernand Braudel's inspiring book about everyday life in the
Renaissance and its significance in the broader history of that time. Fernand Braudel and
James Joyce are the central figures in modernity's peculiar concern with the details of
everyday life.
Most everyone's house has a stack of waste newspapers. There's a whole institution, to
stacks of newspapers. Ours is under a PDP-1 scope, but otherwise it's just like everyone
else's. You know how in the middle of the Sunday paper there's this worthless section of
paper that you could just pull out and throw away if it didn't have the Parade Magazine
hidden in it? Well, I had just thrown that section on our stack of newspapers when
something stopped me. Once I turned and looked down at the stack, I knew how to start
this talk.
You know how when you're trying to give cough syrup to a small child, you've got the
spoon and you've got a bottle of cough syrup, and you pour it right up to the brim?
Everybody pours it right up to the brim so that the only thing keeping it on the spoon is
surface tension. Really bright. And you try to put it in the child's mouth and it spills all
over the place.
This routine of trying to give cough syrup to a small child is an institution itself.
Everybody's had to do it once or twice. This spilling is also an institution. This notion of a
thing that commonly goes wrong in the course of a routine pattern of activity is what I'd
call a hassle. It's the sort of thing you say what a hassle about in casual conversations. And
it's one of the things I've been studying over the last year or so. What I saw in the stack of
newspapers was an advertisement for a new brand of cough syrup in gel form that doesn't
fall off the spoon.
When I saw this out of the corner of my eye, it took me about a quarter of a second to
realize that using it to start this talk would let me introduce two central ideas. The first is
the notions of a routine, and particularly the use of identifiable hassles in recognizing
opportunities to modify a routine. The second is the amazing phenomenon whereby I
knew this advertisement is the right way to start my talk having seen it for about a quarter
of a second. I hear different numbers for how long it takes a signal to propagate through a
neuron. Whatever it is, divide it into 250 milliseconds and something very interesting was
happening in that many neurons deep in my brain. People toss out perfectly funny jokes in
casual conversation in less time than that. That's really remarkable.
I've been studying the mundane activities that rush by in your stream of consciousness
without calling much attention to themselves. That they go by in your mind so fast and
that you do them so routinely tells us a lot about the structure of the mind. I have a thesis,
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as yet undefined, well, certainly as yet unwritten, that I want to defend today. It comes in
three parts.
The first part is that the structures we find in everyday life reflect structures in the mind. I
hope everybody here finds this intuitive, because we've been acting like we believe this for
so long now. People around here sometimes call those structures in life constraints. But
what I mean by structures and reflect I haven't told you yet.
The second part is that the mind is not the way it is out of arbitrariness or accidents of
evolution. Instead, we build our minds as a rational response to the impediments to
everyday living posed by fundamental laws of computation. We can write those laws down,
and I will. The joking way to put it is that I can derive all of psychology from four axioms.
This talk is mythically in two parts. This first part concerns about the first two of these
axioms.
The third part is that we can find these structures in everyday life, and that one good way to
find them is introspection, All of the modern history of psychological methodology
notwithstanding. There are lots of criticisms of introspection out there, but I think what
they come down to is that we don't have a good observation vocabulary for introspective
observation of what goes on in people's minds. I want you to come away with the idea that
computation provides an observation vocabulary for introspection. Don't think of it as you
can see yourself working like as a computer. Think of it this way: computation provides a
vocabulary of immense power for describing structures and processes, and we can use that
vocabulary to observe ourselves and give interpretations to thoughts that otherwise sail by
unarticulated.
Among my inspirations for this research is a book by Jean-Paul Sartre called Transcendence
of the Ego, which says that phenomenologically the workings of your mind are external to
you. They are transcendent in the same sense as any process out in the world is external to
you, not something that is immediately given to consciousness. That's a pretty routine
matter of experience and becomes an even more routine matter once you've learned to
name what's going on in your mind as it's going by. Another of my influences is David
Marr, who started (but, I claim, didn't nearly finish) the very hard job of providing a
proper computational construction of the competence performance distinction. People are
beginning to get it down for purposes of studying the peripheral systems of mind, but it's a
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much harder thing to get straight for the central systems of mind, the parts that do the
thinking and the feeling.
My method is simple. The theory predicts that a certain class of events will take place in
your life, that you'll think a certain way and will act a certain way, or in certain classes of
ways. I sit awhile and reflect on the prediction, and I convince other people to reflect on it
too. Then one day in the midst of some entirely mundane activity, like making breakfast,
or driving to work, or picking up a coffee mug, or putting down a coffee mug, or opening
your mail, or choosing a turnstile on the subway, or using Emacs, or any of those things you
feel like you're doing automatically, I'll wake up and say, what just happened is an instance
ofthe theory. I don't know why this happens, but it does. When it does, I stop and I write it
down. So that by now I have fairly thick notebooks full of relentlessly mundane stories
about making breakfast and driving to work. Some of them are very funny, but most of
them are boring.
I've discovered that I can learn an amazing amount about how people make breakfast that
they weren't even fully aware they knew. Whenever anyone asks me about my work, after I
tell them all this high-falutin stuff about the structures in everyday life, I bring the
conversation around to, say, making breakfast, making cereal, say. A lot of people start
fidgeting when I say for example a lot of people have little tricks for slicing bananas onto
their cereal they've invented and never been able to tell anyone about. The one third of the
cereal eating population who has such a trick falls into two groups. There are the relatively
uninhibited people who start uncontrollably pantomiming banana-slicing actions that
they've invented and that they've never been able to tell anyone about their whole lives.
The most common one is slicing the banana with your spoon. Most everyone who does this
thinks they're the only one in the world. I used to slice the banana with my spoon after
somebody told me about the idea. I thought it was a great invention until I discovered that
I had to move my thumb or my little finger to some strange place on the spoon to get
around the fact that all the spoons I have have these narrow little necks so when you try to
cut the banana you have no way to keep the spoon from spinning in your hand. Spoons
weren't meant to cut bananas with; knives were. I've gone back to using a knife. More
controlled people manage to restrain themselves, and deliver me scholarly lectures on the
optimal way to slice bananas, sometimes extending for half an hour. I've learned an awful
lot about slicing bananas this way.
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Next I want to explain some of the intuitions that this work is built on. There's not much
new about them. I want to talk about two classes of intuitions, ones concerning lattices (a
lattice being a partial order with least common superior and greatest common inferior
operations), and arguments, as in the method of dialectical argumentation. Intuitions
about lattices and arguments account for an awful lot of the thinking that goes on in
everyday life.
Ideas about lattices explain most of the symbolic inductive learning literature in Al,
although unfortunately most of that literature is not stated in terms of lattice theory. In
particular, theories of analogy are about lattices. If I have situation A and situation B, and
situations A and B are analogous, it's by virtue of them both being instances of some C; if
something is true of A that would be useful to carry over to B, it can be abstracted and put
on C, and brought down to B. This is more roundabout than the account that says that you
use analogies by translating knowledge across structural mappings. You don't really see the
purpose for explaining analogy such a complicated way until you've got 100,000 A's and
100,000 B's very widely separated from one another, each of them in extremely
cumplicated situations. A typical analogy will carry over five elements from one situation
to another, and figuring out which five are important is a tremendous search problem,
among other things.
Here's an example. I often come home late at night after all the lights are out. We have
roaches in our apartment that come back every once in a while. We cover the place with
poison and traps. We've even tried cleaning the place up, but nothing stops them. So part
of my routine when I come home at midnight and the lights are out is to use this propane
torch to kill a few roaches before going to bed. The way to kill roaches, as everyone knows,
is to reach up and turn on the light, whereupon they all head for cover. You've got about a
second to kill them before they're all gone. There's a problem, though. The torch has a
knob with has three settings, Clean, On and Off, and the flame only comes out when it's
On. When it's dark you can't see where the knob is, and when you turn on the light to
move the knob to On the roaches scatter. I discovered this at very great length, and I found
myself standing in the kitchen in the middle of the night squinting at this knob trying to see
where it was, so as to get it to On. One night I thought this is silly. Then it occurred to me
the foolproof way to get the switch to On was to turn the switch all the way around to Off,
then click it back one. It would then be guaranteed to be On, wherever it started. I was
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proud of myself. This is now part of my routine. I come home, the torch is always sitting
in the same place, I pick it up, I turn it, I turn on the light and I blast some roaches.
Next morning after I discovered this trick I was trying to park a very large car in a very
small space, in Chinatown. It had an automatic transmission, and I had to go from Drive to
Reverse to Drive to Reverse to get the car wiggled into this little space with all these
pedestrians walking in front and behind the car trying to get me to crush their legs. I didn't
have any time to be looking at the transmission to put it into each new gear; my eyes had
other things to do. A common pattern to changes in routines is freeing up your eyes to do
other things, omitting perceptual steps by somehow forcing the world into a known state
and then putting it from there into a state you want. (One place it occurs a lot is in Emacs,
when the system load is high. Control-A puts the cursor at the beginning of the line no
matter what and you can work from there. When the system finally gets around to
redisplaying, you've gotten all kinds of work done if you were on the right line.) I
remember the day when I first learned the order of the positions on an automatic
transmission, long after I learned to use the automatic transmission. It's Park, Reverse,
Neutral, Drive, Second, First, six positions. if you're in Drive, clunking it two left gets it
into Reverse; if you're in Reverse, clunking it two right gets it into Drive. That much I had
known for a long time, but I kept getting lost, so I'd still have to look and see where I was.
The problem was I didn't have the thing in a known state. After about the fifth time this
happened, right at that same point where I-said this is silly, I made the analogy, picked up
the lever, whacked it all the way left into Park and one right into Reverse.
The analogy between those two situations is based on a particular subset of facts from the
two situations. These situations are characterized by 100,000 facts, of which about three are
carried by a mapping to make that analogy. For purposes of analogy, a good
representation normalizes your understanding of a situation so that you can make the
proper analogenic generalization of a situation, from among the huge space of
generalizations you might make. If you pull away the common elements of any good
analogy, the resulting abstract model will have a certain hard-to-define sense of
completeness or closure to it. It is worthwhile cataloging these models. I call them the
generic models.
There are an awful lot of generic models. To get an idea of what they're like, have a look at
Figure 1. This is a diagram of some of the lattice relationship among a variety of knobs,
Figure 1.
Here is a part of your mental lattice of models of knobs, buttons, and switches. One role of
the generic models in the lattice is to mediate otherwise obscure analogies between very
different phenomena, like the propane torch and automatic transmission of the text.
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buttons and switches. The topmost elements of the lattice are the most abstract. These
most abstract elements are Chapman's cognitive cliches. Cognitive cliches are the periodic
table of representation, the simple models out of which more complex models are built. In
a simple situation like this the models will tend to be just plain single cognitive cliches and
more complex models will be more complex.
As you descend into the lattice, its elements become more and more specific. The bottom
of the lattice is populated by the details of specific experiences from your life. A lattice is
like a tree except that branches that spread out might rejoin further down. This is called
reconvergence. The reason it has a name is that it's almost impossible to make a large
number of algorithms execute proper reconvergences at the same time in a Connection
Machine. This is a severe technical challenge for Connection Machine programming.
The analogy between the torch knob and the automatic transmission lever can be located
by finding their least common generalization, which is the notion of a discrete scale. Some
explanation will help. A register is a cell that has exactly one value taken from some set. A
scale is a register whose set is totally ordered and has a pair of extrema. So for example, the
range between 0 and 1, or the values Park, Reverse, Neutral, Drive, Second and First might
be ranges that a scale could have. As you go down the lattice the models get more and
more specific. Think of all of these models as being implemented by frames. Each link in
the lattice specializes the idea above it to the idea below it. Each link either adds a new slot
to the frame above, or adds some new restrictions on things that can fill existing slots.
My plan for using the torch knob depends only on the properties of that torch knob that
are summed up in the notion of a discrete scale. There's a current position out of some
discrete totally ordered set of values, I can tell when I'm at an extremum, and I have the
option of moving either one left or one right at a time. The trick was to go all the way to
the minimum and count from there to the place I wanted to go. Associated with every plan
is an argument explaining why it ought to work. What's remarkable about my torch knob
plan is that the premises of its argument refer only to properties of torches and knobs and
roaches and fingers that can be abstracted in the idea of a discrete scale. I propose that I
installed the plan and its associated argument in the discrete scale fragie, hoping to apply it
to some future discrete scale. The process by which an argument is associated with the
most abstract frame that accounts for its premises is called argument indexing. What facts
about the current situation does this argument really depend on? The more you can abstract
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the premises of an argument away from particulars, the more you can generalize it. The
average argument depends on fairly specific facts; one that doesn't is an important
discovery. This is not a radical novelty; Paul Rosenbloom at CMU wrote a thesis about a
fairly similar idea called chunking.
My plan for turning my torch on in the dark originated with the volume knob on the
amplifier in my office. This knob floats between three different values, around 3 when I'm
using the speakers during the day, around 5 when I'm using the speakers at night, and
around 9 when I'm using the headphones. One day I pulled out the headphones and
turned on the speakers, went away, came back after a while, and dropped the needle on the
record. From that day on I have remembered to turn the volume back to a safe value
before leaving the room. So part of my routine for leaving my office for any period is to
turn the knob down to 3. Now I have better things to do with my eyes than look where the
volume knob is, so one day I somehow invented the trick of turning the knob down all the
way and turning it up to an amount that corresponds roughly to 3. The exact value doesn't
much matter, but if I care about it I can get it somewhere between 2.5 and 3.5.
I certainly can't prove it to you, but I think that I came up with my torch knob trick by
indexing the argument for the volume knob plan. When I abstracted away from it being
volume and not temperature and the extrema being 0 and 10 and not 5.1 and 5.2 and the
fact that I was leaving my office and a lot of other facts, I arrived at the notion of a
continuous scale. A continuous scale is a pointer into some continuum, and you can engage
in the process of moving it left or the process of moving it right, and you have a way of
knowing whether it's at one of the extremes. Frequently you also have some rough
correlation in mind between the degree of motion and other variables, like how much noise
is going to come out.
I claim that I reformulated that plan from the continuous terms to the discrete terms. It
works just as well to clunk, clunk, clunk as to go through a process. A smooth process is
often reformulated as a series of steps and vice versa. This phenomena of reformulating
between continuous and discrete models of things is absolutely ubiquitous in everyday
reasoning. It's about the most common form of reformulation, changing of models for
situations in everyday life. This is called aggregation by Dan Weld. Aggregation is
reformulating from repetitious discrete events to a smooth process, and disaggregation is
going the other way. As Chapman says, continuous scales approximate.discrete scales. The
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reformulation carries over all the ideas of each model, including your ability to move in
either direction or to tell when you're at an extreme. So the argument for the continuous
form of the trick can be translated into an argument for the discrete version. ,,
The figure mentions some other examples. The only other one I want to talk about is the
tuner knob in a lot of car radios, you turn it, and turn it, and turn it, and turn it, and you
realize it doesn't stop at the end of the scale and you've been at 1600AM for the last five
minutes driving down the road. You thought you had some idea how to fill in the slot that
explains how to tell you're at an extreme, when in fact you didn't. So you formulate a wish.
I wish I had some way to tell when I was at the end You have a lot of these wishes floating
around in your head. I wish I had a way not to spill the cough syrup. I wish I had a way to
make automatic door closers not knock the packages out of my hands. I wish for an awful
lot of things, most of them very mundane. Most of your wishes you don't even know
about. Each wish combs through everyday experience looking for some way to make itself
come true.
I also remember the day I discovered this phenomenon, noticing myself spinning the dial.
The trick I was using to be sure I was at the end was to turn it the distance roughly
corresponding to the whole length of the dial, so I'd be sure it was at the end. Doing so, I
noticed a slight change in the amount of resistance the knob was putting up. The wish
about a way to fill the slot explaining how to tell when I'm at the end of the scale raised its
hand. I then checked whether that change of resistance meant I was at the end of the dial,
and it did, whereupon that slot got filled back in again.
Let's have a look at this fork. I've been spending a lot of time looking at tools of all kinds
lately, especially carpentry tools. Mike Brady, Jon Connell, Dave Braunegg, and I will
someday finish a paper on tools called The Mechanic's Mate. I just want to mention a
couple of the most relevant things from it. A good tool makes a simple model of its. use
work reliably. So a good knife is sharp and a good pan distributes heat evenly. Forks have
about four or five ways they are meant to be used, and very many ways they can be used.
And for each of those different ways of using a fork, there is a different best model of the
fork. For stabbing things the fork is a set of spears; for scooping things up a fork is a flat
plate; for cutting things with the side of the fork the fork is a blade; for mashing things it's
a grating; for pushing things around it's just a block. And there are others. Figure 2 shows
part of a lattice, with the general notion of a fork under all its possible models.
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Figure 2.
Associated with each of uses of a fork is a different best model to adopt. The outlines of
each plan for using a fork are provided by the generic plans associated with the relevant
generic model. Thus, one way to wash out a grating is to run water through it from the
back, whether the grating is a fork, a piece of cloth, or a cheese grater.
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The ideas of blade, plate, grating, set-of-spears, and block are all generic models. Generic
models are frames in your lattice, trying to apply themselves wherever they can be applied.
Each model contains a stock of wisdom about what you can do if you are close enough to
be correct in viewing something as being an instance of one of that model. A generic
model, like any good representation, suppresses irrelevant details. When you're viewing a
fork as a flat plate you ignore all the space between the tines; sometimes that's good
enough. The grating model ignores the sharp edges; sometimes that works too. The rule is
to plan with the most convenient model and to debug or plan defensively with the least
convenient model. Just about everything that can go wrong in the course of using a fork
comes from the fork behaving according to a different model than the one you were using.
So if you try to use a fork as a flat plate and scoop something up with it, a couple of things
might happen: it might be behaving as a block and pushing the peas ahead of it, or as a set
of spears stabbing some of the peas and pushing the rest ahead of them. Now if you try to
cut something it might be dull, behaving as a block. If you try to mash something, the tines
might stab it and get stuck. When the fork bends or breaks or melts it's behaving as a
plastic or a liquid (or whatever, according to your particular ontology).
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Each these generic model has associated with it a number of generic plans. Blades have a
plan for cutting associated with them. It says cause the blade to pass through the thing along
the plane you want to make the cut. Plates have plans for mashing; blocks have plans for
smashing or for scooping up; spears have plans for stabbing. To wash out a grating, turn it
upside down and run water on it. That plan works for all the other things that are gratings
as well, like cloth or cheese graters.
That's all I want to say about lattices and arguments. What I want to do next is frame all
what I just said in terms of these long-awaited laws of computation. I tend to state what I
call the Laws of Computation in somewhat facetious ways to indicate that this isn't yet, as I
wish it were, a formal research program. Maybe someday. The first law of computation is
that no model is ever good enough, because the world is a complicated and confusing and
messy place, and because of the poverty of stimulus in any delineated domain. This law
has a lot of corollaries. One that you can observe in kitchens and garages and other
institutional work places is the contract that things behave according to simple models.
You try to keep your knives sharp, and you try to keep salt in stock.
Another less visible corollary of the first law is that the mind spends an awful lot of time
keeping track of models, trying to invent new ones, trying to apply old ones in new ways,
trying to figure out which one to use when the first one it chose doesn't work. That's what
the idea of a lattice of models is all about. The more abstract generic models at the top of
the lattice can be applied in a lot of different situations, where the generic models at the
bottom are more specific.The relations that hold among the models, the generalization
relations and approximation relations, and probably all kinds of relations I haven't shown
you yet, are the ways you move around in the space of models.
Part of making theories of these things is understanding what the generic models are in
different parts of life and watching myself, for example, reformulating among them. The
trash can in the men's room on the seventh floor (I assume the women's room is somewhat
analogous) is set in the wall and has a narrow flat rim. I happened to set my coffee mug
down on that rim and right before my eyes, the rim alternated between the model of a
surface and the model of a blade. When you. put something down on a surface it stays
there, and when you put something down on a blade, it rocks a bit and falls into the trash
can. One of the things that's on the approximation link between a flat surface and a blade
is a suggestion to look for the rocking motion that indicates that it's behaving the wrong
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way. The link also has a plan for testing if it's going to behave the wrong way, which is to
rock it a bit deliberately and see if it cooperates, and a description of the usual way you
knock something off an almost-blade, which is that your hand or some other tool knocks it
while moving back toward you in the course of doing something else. All of which
happened.
The facetious way of stating the other law of computation I want to mention right now is
that all problems in AI are search problems and all search problems are intractable. (All
exceptions granted.) For present purposes, it's a lot harder to prove a theorem than to
check a proof. (Theorem proving is often formulated as a search in proof space.) If we
really worked that way, we wouldn't be very smart, but the point stands nevertheless. So
think of looking for a proof as looking for a path through a dense forest.
One of the corollaries of it being so very hard to prove a theorem, to find a path through
the woods, is that when you've found a path it's a good idea to hang on to it. In other
words, you spend a lot of time keeping track of old thoughts and trying to apply them in
new situations because that's so much easier than having to face each situation afresh. In
other words, just about all the thoughts you think are old thoughts. That people tend to
think and speak in cliches is an important constraint on the structure of the mind Argument
indexing is a method for making maps of useful paths through the woods and applying
those maps to as many new problems as possible.
Another corollary of the second law is in the notion of wishing. A wish says, I can't find a
way through the woods, but I'm going to assign someone the task of looking out for a way
through the woods from this point, in case I need to do it again myself. So in the back of
your mind a lot of little mechanisms are looking for inspiration about ways to finish a
search through the woods.
Those intuitions took several months to invade my daily life enough that I could actually
see instances of them happening, because they're so very abstract. It's hard to recognize the
applicability of anything that's so very abstract. More generally, things that are lower on
the lattice are much easier to notice instances of than things higher in the lattice. There's a
trade-off: abstract ideas are more widely applicable and concrete ideas are easier to use.
Now I want to tell you about the main thing I did once I had figured these things out for
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myself. I had a long look at routines, such as administering cough syrup and driving to
work and making breakfast. Routines are frequently repeated and phenomenologically.
automatic patterns of activity. Most of daily life is made up of routines. Routines are hard
to study because they're invisible. You don't notice routine thoughts as they're going by in;
your head. People talk about themselves as if they're carrying out routines automatically,
like the person who responded to the news that I (then) intended to make robot make
breakfast by saying oh, I'm a robot when I make breakfast. People always sound a little
nervous when they say things like that because they know the words automatically,
mechanically don't nearly capture what it feels like to do these things routinely. My theory
of routines is both a computational theory of what mechanical things are going on in your:
mind when you're doing something routinely, and also a phenomenological theory of what
it's like to do something routinely. The interlinking of these two parts of the theory is
important: it's hard to give articulation to what it's like unless you have a good vocabulary
to describe it. And computation provides that vocabulary.
My theory of routines had its origin over the last summer, a time when my life was
constantly changing around. I worked in different places and I lived in different places and
I had different cars and I was on different schedules, and so on. Everything would switch
around and my life would settle down to a new set of daily routines. The routine of getting
lunch differs according to where I'm working and what my means of transportation are and
so on. The routes I walk from different places change when I have different places to walk.
Each time life settled into a routine, I wrote down what was happening that constituted
settling into a routine. Observation led to theory led to observation led to theory led me to
talk to you here.
Everyday activity is marked by improvisation and the gradual precipitation of routine
patterns of activity. The first time you face a novel problem, one for which indexed
arguments don't suffice, you have to muddle through. You solve it by rough analogies but
mostly by weak methods. You use simple, safe things that work, like taking the interstates
even though the back roads would do and using GPS even though there are canned
algorithms that will do it in less than exponential time. The period of improvisation before
a routine is set up is marked most particularly by the attitude you take toward the world.
You're dealing with the world through simple representations, and the situations the world
presents you are very often unanticipated. Your attitude is, in this sense, reactionary.
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In the course of carrying out a routine you come to understand what the process of carrying
out the routine amounts to. You make a model of the process of carrying out the routine.
This model, like all models, is made out of frames in this lattice. If you're lucky, the model
will contain indexed arguments about how better to carry out that activity. This is called
internalizing the process.
As a routine develops, it takes account of finer details on the part of the world you're
moving through. It does so by using successively different models, making successively,
smaller changes, noticing successively smaller things. Settling down a routine is a skill for
each particular domain. There are particular skills for settling down a routine for walking
from here to there, for carrying out a recipe, for using a tool. There are a lot of particular
skills for making a routine settle down. I have a rough theory about how this settling down
works. It says that routines develop in stages. (A more accurate statement would be that
any particular domain the skill of settling down a routine develops in stages.)
I'm going to distinguish five stages.
The first stage is the stage of recapitulated reasoning; its mechanism is simple argument
indexing. Your mind takes arguments that worked and stores them away for future
application. If some strategy works fine the first time, then you'll keep on doing it that
way. So if you drive somewhere and the route it doesn't seem to be taking any longer than
it ought and nothing especially dangerous or memorable happens and nobody tells you
about a better route, then without even thinking about it you'll use that route again, unless
you're the kind of person who always enjoys finding the very best route.
The second stage is the primitive credit assignment stage. My skills at the development of
routines for navigation are stunted at this stage, I've decided. My evidence is that I have
many pairs of places that I walk between routinely, and my routes are often not reverses of
one another. One example is walking between Technology Square and the Institute main
campus and back, something I do an awful lot. The route I walk from my home to the
Washington Street subway is very different in the morning from the route coming back in
the evening. They're roughly the same length but it never occurred to me to even think
that they were different.
Here's why. Phenomenologically speaking, in this second stage you're still reacting to the
- 15 -
world to a fair degree, behaving myopically. As I walk, I make each choice about which
way to turn based on considerations that the environment immediately suggests to me. I
have no map, or only a very sketchy one. Finding yourself at a choice point when walking
somewhere is a metaphor for all decision at this stage. Often you have a decision to make
and you can't think of any argument that distinguish between the two choices, you can
think of arguments both ways, but you can't think of any way to distinguish between the
arguments. (An example is when you're sitting in a restaurant staring at a menu full of
perfectly good things to eat for half an hour, unable to decide exactly which one to eat.) At
those decision points it frequently in a very faint way occurs to you to try and come up with
some more evidence to decide which way to go, but the evidence really has to impose itself
on you. You've got to see the puddle that you had to walk through when you went this way
last time. You have to see the bushes you had to squeeze through that way last time. Out
of sight, out of mind.
So, just the other side of Main Street are buildings 45 and 48. You walk between
Technology Square over the railroad tracks over to the main campus, you go through this
parking lot and there's this sidewalk with hedges along it. Does everybody know the place
I'm talking about? You walk through a parking lot there. Now imagine coming the other
way. There are three routes to go. One is down that sidewalk. The problem with that
sidewalk is there's this hedge to your right and you end up about 10 yards further along
Main Street than you'd like to be. And a second route is along that rutted dirt road whose
ruts always have six inches of water in them. It's not very much fun to walk along when it's
dark. The third on is to cut between the bushes along the path everyone's worn into the
grass. They plant new bushes and lay down new the grass about every six months, and it's
worn down in two or three days. Through a series of applications of primitive credit
assignment, I've evolved this complicated way of deciding which of those three paths to
take, depending on how recently it's rained, whether they've put in bushes recently, how
the cars are arranged in the parking lot, and how dark it is. (And I'll bet you have too, and
aren't willing to admit it.) But even so, I take an entirely different route when going the
other way.
The third stage is called scene characterization. Routine evolution, as I have mentioned,
involves the internalization of process, and the first process representation is very much like
Schank's idea of a script. Scripts are made up of scenes. Once I was writing a paper about
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this over at the late Atari Cambridge Research. Every half an hour I'd get up and make
another cup of tea. I hadn't used this kitchen and its particular set of tea-making
technology before. I'd go in, I'd get the teabag and put it in the cup, I'd get out the kettle
and fill it with water, and I'd put it on the stove. And one day while I was doing all this it
occurred to me that I should be putting the water on the stove first and getting the other
things out afterward. The next time I went into make tea, I went straight for the kettle,
filled it, and put it on the stove. But then I thought hang on, this is an electric stove. The
next time out I turned on the electric stove before filling the kettle.
This story illustrates two instances of a very common way of rearranging a routine, moving
some activity into a waiting period. An especially complicated instance is the subway
commuter's trick of standing on the platform so that when you get in the subway and out at
your destination station you'll be standing in front of the exit. There's a red and white sign
hanging from the ceiling on the Washington Street northbound Red Line platform; if I get
on the train right by this sign, I'll be right in front of the most convenient exit in the
Kendall Square station. You're going to have to walk some distance along train platforms
no matter what; with this trick you do that walking while waiting for the train rather than
after it arrives.
Suppose you didn't have the idea of waiting in your head. You could spend ten minutes
every morning of your life staring into space until the water boils without ever clearly
formulating what exactly is bothering you. But, fortunately, waiting for water to boil and
waiting for an electric stove to heat up are notorious hassles. By putting names to hassles,
you provide yourself with a way of noticing that something is more trouble than it ought to
be. (There are other heuristics for noticing excessive effort. It's just not trivial.) There's a
lattice of hassles. (Of course; there's a lattice of everything.) Near the bottom of this lattice
are hassles peculiar to particular routines, like spilling cough syrup or bagels getting stuck
in the toaster. Higher up in this lattice are the generic hassles, like waiting, spilling things,
having to work in a clumsy position, bad vibes from any other person, and any number of
others.
Associated with each generic hassle in the lattice are suggestions about what to do about it.
So one way to avoid waiting is to try to move some activity into the waiting periods from
somewhere else. You can avoid making a mess by spreading newspaper to catch it. You
can avoid spilling something by using a larger container, making several smaller trips, or
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increasing the stuffs viscosity. I submit that it's not obvious a priori that you can alleviate
the hassle of waiting by moving useful activity into the waiting period. If you didn't
categorize hassles, it would require a fresh miracle to figure this out on every new occasion
of waiting. In the Mechanic's Mate paper, we give a list of generic hassles that come up
frequently in carpentry, like having to work in tight spaces or always having to alternate
tools. Generic hassles suggest generic repairs.
The fourth stage of routine development is the stage of process characterization. Now I
have to stop being sloppy in distinguishing between a routine and a plan. A routine is not a
plan.. Recall how I spoke of routines as precipitating from improvised activity. Themore
your improvisation responds to discovered contingencies of the environment instead of
imposing a preconstructed plan, the more likely there is to be unanticipated structure to the
activity. As the improvised activity settles into a routine, you can notice that structure and
use it in changing how you carry out the activity.
My favorite example (made up, though the pattern is common enough) is vacuuming the
dining room. Vacuum. Vacuum. Vacuum. As I vacuum up to this chair, the prerequisite
for making further forward progress is defeated. So I move the chair and vacuum under it.
Very good. And I vacuum along and there's another chair, and I move that one out of the
way and I vacuum under it and I move along and there's another chair. Oops, I move that
out of the way, and I vacuum under it. Slowly it dawns on me that there's a pattern. I'm
moving a lot of chairs. After noticing that, I can build a representation of the vacuuming
process as one of interleaving the processes of floor-vacuuming and chair-moving. There
are generic processes, and the idea of interleaving is one of them. The generic process of
interleaving suggests you try deinterleaving. Move all the furniture, then vacuum the
whole floor.
These later stages are marked by your global understanding of the process of carrying out a
routine. Where once you were reacting to environmental contingencies, now you are
participating in a process. Imagine you're riding a roller coaster. It makes a big difference
to the experience whether you understand what a roller coaster is.
The final stage of routine development is called process manipulation, a much more formal
version of the previous stage. The prototype of this stage is not in everyday life but in
business management. Operations researchers and strategic analysts make elaborate
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models of parts of corporations and apply abstract manipulations to them to come up with
revised administrative procedures. Or that's the theory. They call it "rationalization",
which I find an interesting choice of name. The word routinization, in fact, I got from
Alfred Chandler's work on the development of modern corporate organization.
I want to finish by sketching where this is going. Yes, there's going to an implementation.
I told you that this was the first part of a mythical two-part talk. The other part of the talk
is about the other laws of computation. What follows from the other laws is what we know
as the theory of personality. These laws of computation are equally facetious, or more so,
at this point and I don't understand them as well. The first is something like everything that
happens needs an explanation. Several years ago someone kidnapped a whole bus of school
children. After they were ransomed, some psychiatrists asked these kids why this
incomprehensible thing had happened. The kids all had bizarre explanations of things they
had done to cause this bad thing to happen to them, things like stealing cookies, or going
into the living room when mom was away and she told them not to. Because it's important
to have explanations of things that happen, the dynamics of trying to explain things that
happen explain a lot of the dynamics of what goes on affectively in one's mind.
The last one I understand even less. I've been concerned throughout with very mundane
thoughts that sail by without your paying any attention, and so are for any practical
purposes unconscious. Consciousness and unconsciousness are matters of what thoughts
you pay attention to. You can fail to pay attention to a thought either because it's so
mundane and unproblematic that you never had any reason to pay attention to it, or
because you're actively repressing it. The law says, attention is a resource. One reason you
have a self is to focus your attention on things that are important. Your personality is in
large measure your strategies for focusing your attention on different levels. You know
that look people get on their faces when they're doing something dumb, and down deep
they know it, but they'd rather not notice. That sort of not really seeing what's going
around them. That phenomenon is continuous with people not noticing the thoughts
they're carrying out as they make breakfast. Both are policies about attention.
